Speeches, etc.

Margaret Thatcher

Radio Interview for IRN (London NATO Summit)

Document type: Speeches, interviews, etc.
Venue: Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, Westminster, London
Source: Thatcher Archive: COI transcript
Journalist: Gareth Furby, IRN
Editorial comments: Late morning.
Importance ranking: Major
Word count: 1123
Themes: Defence (general), Defence (arms control), Foreign policy (Central & Eastern Europe), Foreign policy (USSR & successor states)

Interviewer

Could I ask you to sum up the importance of today's communique?

Douglas HurdForeign Secretary

Yes, of course. It is important we keep a sure defence, that is the lesson of history and that we must continue to do. As well, it is important that we adapt to the changes that we have seen in Eastern Europe where Soviet forces are withdrawing from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and there is a fundamental change in the Soviet Union. That means that we have to look at our force levels, at our equipment and at our whole strategy so at the same time as we keep the strong defence we try to look at reducing the level of armaments and men and that is right.

Interviewer

So is this historic, are we looking at an historic day? [end p1]

Prime Minister

Yes, it is historic. First it is historic because of what we are doing in military terms but it is historic because of the reason which brings it about. Ten years ago we would not have thought it possible that the Soviet Union would be rejecting communism, that she would withdraw from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, this would have been a dream. That dream is happening but they are finding it more difficult than they thought to change from their intensely rigid communist system to a market economy and there were bound to be difficulties but my goodness me the goal is worthwhile.

So we have somehow to show in the level of the weapons we have and in the numbers of men and women that we have in the Armed Forces, that we are recognising that position because no-one is keener than we are to see them getting to democracy and a rule of law.

Interviewer

You have always stressed that NATO must retain an effective nuclear deterrent but according to the communique NATO's nuclear arms are now going to be called weapons of last resort. Now, are you happy about that?

Prime Minister

If that was the only sentence in I would not be happy about it, but in the same paragraph it also points out our previous agreement that anyone who crossed into our territory must always be aware that we might use short-range nuclear weapons against him and he will never know whether we will or not. That has been NATO doctrine for some considerable time and we are retaining that and [end p2] you have to retain that because that is the deterrent effect. If ever he was ever able to think, “My goodness, I can cross two-thirds, three-quarters of the way across Europe, and that will not be last resort so I will be all right,” we can have another third conventional war in Europe. That is not our purpose, we have to keep the deterrent value of those nuclear weapons and so that also is there.

I think the difference now is that whereas the Soviet troops have been right on the front-line, that is to say they have been in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, right in East Germany, in future they will withdraw from many of those countries and so there would be quite a period before we could ever get a sudden attack and that means a certain difference in the way in which we position our forces. But the nuclear deterrent, both short and long, remain.

Interviewer

You are satisfied then that NATO still retains an effective nuclear deterrent despite this declaration?

Prime Minister

Oh yes, because you say despite that declaration, you look at the next sentence and you will find in it just precisely what I have said.

Interviewer

Even though the Americans are now thinking about pulling out their nuclear shells provided the Soviet Union does the same? [end p3]

Prime Minister

Those are artillery shells but that is particularly because there will now be this kind of big zone in Europe that if the Soviet Union was ever to attack they would have first to cross so they have lost the capacity for surprise attack which hitherto they have had. The moment they pull out right back to their own borders then it would take a considerable time for them ever to cross that territory and the danger of surprise attack is very much diminished.

Interviewer

What about the invitation to President Gorbachev to address NATO? Do you think that might be premature if he comes before all the arms agreements have been signed, sealed and delivered?

Prime Minister

I made that very point myself because we have been talking about these arms control agreements, I think it is very important to get the big one on conventional forces signed before Mikhail Gorbachevhe comes then we are not merely talking about reductions but we are starting to implement the first reductions and I think that would be a very much better atmosphere for him to come.

Interviewer

So you would not be happy to see him before?

Prime Minister

I am always happy, as you know, to see him because I think every time East and West gets together and talks frankly I think we profit from knowing their problems and I think they profit from [end p4] seeing new worlds which they have never known. And their great problem at the moment is that please they would like the kind of prosperity and the kind of freedom and justice we have but they do not know how to bring it about. So the more they come and see and the more we are able to show them how it is done then I think that is greatly to their advantage.

Interviewer

Finally, it has been suggested that you may have been somewhat out of step with your NATO colleagues here, in that they were going out of their way to show the Soviet Union that NATO is not a threat, but you have been saying all along that we must have a deterrent and really that has been your message which has conflicted with the message from the others.

Prime Minister

Where do you get this idea from? I was not alone in saying that short-range nuclear weapons must always be a deterrent, France for example is very keen on that in Europe, do not forget, it is only France and ourselves who are nuclear powers. So the nuclear powers agreed on that and there was no difficulty about having the other sentence in the communique that we simply must keep the deterrent effect of short-range. We had no difficulty at all, we put the point, at once it was realised. And everyone, but everyone, has learned the lessons of history. You must always keep a sure defence so that any potential adversary will know first that he may meet nuclear weapons, and that is the greatest deterrent; secondly, that unlike last time when as you have heard from some of the [end p5] fifty year programmes, forty-five year programmes too, we were not really prepared, if ever anything came up, this time we would always be prepared and that is the greatest deterrent of all.