Prime Minister
Ladies and Gentlemen, we have had a very successful Summit, the atmosphere was extremely good, the purpose has been achieved and it was achieved here in London.
We had a good discussion yesterday in which we all set out how we see the prospects for NATO and there was a very broad agreement. That is now reflected in the London Declaration which is a landmark in the history of NATO and of Europe.
We all wanted to see NATO adapt to the new situation which has come about because of the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We also wanted to see the changes continue and go further by persuading these countries that they have nothing to fear from NATO or from having a united Germany in NATO. But we are also all agreed that we need to maintain a strong defence because you never know what threat may emerge in the future. A sure defence is the foundation for everything else and we cannot ignore the very substantial military might and its modernisation which the Soviet Union is still conducting. [end p1]
So our task was to strike a balance between these two considerations and that is what our declaration does. In it we agree to carry out a review of NATO's strategy and the consequent size and structure of its conventional forces; to look beyond the current CFE negotiations to further limits on manpower; to reduce the number of NATO's nuclear weapons; to give NATO a bigger political role; and to a large number of measures to strengthen confidence such as building up the thirty-five nation Helsinki Accords; a joint declaration between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and invitations to Mr. Gorbachev and East European leaders to visit NATO.
At the same time we commit ourselves to maintain the main pillars of NATO: an integrated military structure; a mix of conventional and nuclear weapons kept up-to-date as necessary; the continued presence of United States Forces and their nuclear weapons in Europe; and a united Germany in NATO. So NATO will continue to be our Alliance for defence and security.
That is exactly what I called for at the beginning of the Summit. We maintain our unity and resolve in defence and we extend the hand of friendship to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
I believe it will be seen as a positive and forward looking declaration, a constructive response to the statement made by the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow last month, an encouragement to President Gorbachev and others to continue the policies of reform and a reassurance that Britain and our Allies will continue to have a sure defence.
It is an excellent result and I think our visitors have enjoyed the Summit in London. [end p2]
Question (John Dickie, Daily Mail)
Two points: first, President Mitterrand said that both you and he had reservations on the phrasing of “the last resort” . Is that true? And secondly, what sort of message do you think President Gorbachev should take from the London Declaration? Does it really mean that he should go ahead and feel safe to reduce his military budget and reduce his armaments?
Prime Minister
With regard to the “last resort” phrase, I think had that been left just alone it might have given a false impression. It is not left alone, it is made clear that the comprehensive concept phraseology is also relevant and indeed that is imported directly into Clause 18.
Speaking of nuclear weapons, it says: “These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted.” So that keeps the full deterrent effect of short-range nuclear weapons as well as the longer ones and that appears in the same paragraph 18 and you will know that it comes straight out of the comprehensive concept which we spent so much time on agreeing the last time we met.
And on your second point, I think Mr. Gorbachev will be very pleased with it. I think he is concerned that we have a forum in which the United States and Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union can get together to discuss things more frequently and to [end p3] prevent conflicts arising and we have met that by giving an enhanced role to the CSCE. And I think he will be quite pleased with the attempt to build confidence-building measures and I hope with the invitation to him, which has yet to be negotiated, to address NATO, we have not gone into particularly which part of NATO or which forum or when. So I think it is good for NATO and good for Mr Gorbachev.
Question
Following up on the first question, I think we are all anxious to know whether there has in fact been any change in the nuclear doctrine of NATO and very specifically is there a difference between having the flexibility to respond to a conventional attack, which otherwise cannot be stopped, having the flexibility to respond with nuclear weapons, and having the ability to respond with nuclear weapons as a last resort in the event of a conventional attack?
Prime Minister
I think I have already answered half that question by saying that it is quite clear in the communique that the deterrent effect goes to short-range nuclear weapons as well as to the longer-range, and let me repeat the phrase which came from the old comprehensive concept which has been imported into this communique: “There are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted.” So anyone who wanted to cross our borders could never be certain that nuclear weapons could not be used in the short-range against him and you need that to maintain the deterrent effect. [end p4]
There are three parts to this clause and Douglas Hurdthe Foreign Secretary spent an awful long time on it and I spent an even longer time on it before he got at it! So it has got three parts: the first points out that with the withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement we are going into a new military situation because whereas before Soviet forces were stationed right on our borders, and one of the worst things we faced could have been a major surprise attack because they frequently had very heavy forces even if only as a matter of exercises on the borders, with them withdrawing right back into their own territory, that possibility of a surprise attack goes which inevitably would give us far more time if it looked as if there were forces assembling further back to make an attack, to give us a lot more time, less surprise, a lot more time for strenuous diplomatic activity and therefore in that sense we are in a different situation. And I think that is the sense in which nuclear weapons do not become first resort because we have other means because the surprise attack element has gone.
I do not think there is any mystery about it, I think that the nuclear deterrent strategy remains but the difference comes because of the absence of surprise attack and the reduced number of conventional forces right up front.
Question (David Fairhorn, Guardian)
Do you think that the practical effect of the changes to NATO strategy that your communique indicates will be to eliminate nuclear weapons from the territory of the new united Germany? [end p5]
Prime Minister
No, I do not believe so. I think the new strategy that we are asking them to look at and one of the main things they will look at is whether the doctrine of forward defence is still relevant or whether that needs modifying to defence in depth. That would mean in fact your conventional weapons and they must decide on whether they think that needs to be changed and they must also decide on the appropriate mix of weapons.
But fundamental to the whole of NATO strategy are two things: American forces on German soil, accompanied by American nuclear weapons. You will see in another part of the communique that we have repeated the phrase: “To keep the peace the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up-to-date where necessary.”
Now I doubt very much whether Lance will ever be modernised, indeed I think it is accepted now that it will not. But there are of course still maintained on German soil the now coming older-fashioned free-falling nuclear bombs from aircraft and those of course will need modernising. France will need to modernise hers, we shall need to modernise ours and the United States will need to modernise hers and you know the weapon that we have in mind. And I believe that it is absolutely fundamental, and it used to be a part of American belief that it was “No Nukes, No Troops” . So I think it is fundamental to NATO strategy that both of those are kept and maintained on German soil and I hope that will be fully realised and I think that the two clauses in the communique to which I have drawn your attention imply that. [end p6]
Question
How would you evaluate the impact—the influence—of the Declaration on the domestic events in the Soviet Union, on the political life of the Soviet Union, and how would you evaluate the chances for establishing direct contacts between the leaders of East European countries and the Soviet Union with NATO?
Prime Minister
I hope that it will be welcomed in the Soviet Union although, as you know, when you are there obviously the immediate domestic problems are the ones which concern them; they still have not got as many goods in the shops as they would wish to have and obviously that is what they are concerned about more than this, but I think they realise that the world is changing, that the West is supporting the changes and doing everything it can to help the reforms to come to fruition and there is a long way to go yet. [end p7]
As far as East Germany and the other countries of Eastern Europe are concerned, really the West is already very much in contact with them. They come to visit us and I am going to visit Hungary and Czechoslovakia later this year; Mr. de Maiziere has been to see me; he has been to see most Western leaders and, of course, Mr. Gorbachev had just seen him when I saw Mr. Gorbachev, so there is already a good deal of contact going on.
I think that is good because no matter how much you read from telegrams or newspapers, when you actually see a person and discuss things with them, you can get a very different impression and also I think know better how to shape the way ahead, so I hope that they will all be pleased with it.
I must say this finally: the basis from which we have always been able to support what was going on in the Soviet Union is a basis of sure defence and there are many many people in Eastern Europe who hoped that we would always keep up that defence of freedom and justice because they recognised that so long as we were prepared to defend it, there was hope for them one day that they might enjoy the freedom which was so commonplace to us.
Question
After this turning point in NATO, is it … . that France is not a part of the integrated command structure?
Prime Minister
After the turning point? I think it is just the same; it has not changed. Dare I say I wish it would change but I don't [end p8] think that it will and we accept it, but equally may I say this: France has played a very important role in the past few years in the Alliance as a whole; in persuading Germany, for example, that it was absolutely vital to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles, in persuading Germany of the validity and necessity for nuclear weapons and therefore the fact that she had a slightly different position in NATO was used to advantage and she was able to do a certain amount of persuasion which was very telling and very helpful at the time and may continue to be very helpful on that point in the future.
Edwin Roth
Prime Minister, fifteen months ago, after President Gorbachev was here, I used a question at the press conference you gave afterwards to try and get you to give some more political support to Vaclav Havel and the people around him, which you did. Since then, I have met my own Member of Parliament, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg at the election party in East Berlin which was just incredible.
Do you think that this meeting of NATO is to some extent—I have asked the same thing of Chancellor Kohl and President Bush—a celebration of the victory of NATO in the Cold War? The Cold War is over and it is obvious that NATO has won, even if it may not be diplomatic to say so. [end p9]
Prime Minister
I don't think we talk or think in those terms at all. I think what matters to us all is that the enlargement of liberty across Eastern Europe and the possibilities of the full enlargement of it in the Soviet Union and coming to full democracy, are not only in the interest of those people but are in our interest too. You call that “victory” —I think that we might say that it is the most welcome and exciting development this century but if I might say, it is too important, it is too deep merely to be termed as “victory” . It is much more fundamental. “victory” has a feeling that victory is a thing which you attain at a particular moment and what we are talking about is a movement that will take a long time to come to full fruition and which will be of colossal significance in the history of the next century because the more we can extend democracy with the rule of law—because don't forget democracy is not just victory of the majority on an election, it has got to be backed up by an independent rule of law independently administered. Neither of those will last long unless you have a market economy which is not merely a phrase—it is a very vital way of life.
If you get those things extended more progressively, ever wider, then you are genuinely in a new world and I cannot think of a case where you have had a genuine democracy with all of those things at war with another genuine democracy, so it has an effect on the reduction of conflict as well.
So please don't just describe it as “victory” —it is much more fundamental than that. [end p10]
Question
Prime Minister, critics of NATO argue that by this time next year the role of the Alliance will be seriously eroded, partly because the threat from the East no longer exists and partly because other organisations such as the CSCE will be playing a forwarding role. What you say to that?
Prime Minister
“No!” is what I say to that!
First, you must separate the role of NATO and the role of the CSCE. NATO will still be the defensive alliance. It has been tremendously successful and we shall continue to do our practical defence through that.
We shall enlarge our political discussions both in NATO—that is where the main transatlantic political discussions will take place—and we shall also enlarge the political discussions in the Helsinki Accords, but although we meet frequently in Western Europe and across the Atlantic, we don't meet systematically the countries from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and I think that discussion there in the CSCE will be very valuable.
We are not eroding the need for a sure defence and that must be the lesson of this century, that the best way of maintaining peace is to maintain a strong defence. Surely we know that in the last ten years we could not predict the future, we could not predict what has happened in a positive way. Equally, we could not have predicted in this country that the Falklands War would happen; we couldn't have predicted the Iran/Iraq War; and we couldn't have [end p11] predicted the move into Afghanistan. That has all happened in the last eleven years.
Your best way of maintaining your democracy is a sure defence, possibly at a lower level of weapons, but we shall always need to do it and if you have watched in this country some of the films from some of the fifty years celebrations we are having now or remembrances from battles of fifty years ago, what struck me very vividly was the way some of the people who were actually at Dunkirk in the most early days of the War said: “We should never have been sent into battle with these weapons! They just were not good enough!” and we must never never have those who defend us in that position again—and that is why we belong to NATO.
Question (The Globe and Mail)
Are you concerned that the invitation to Mr. Gorbachev seems to be a personal one as opposed to a general one to the leader or President of the Soviet Union and that in doing so, NATO may be predicating that hand of friendship to Moscow on the political fortunes of a single individual who is in some considerable trouble right now?
Prime Minister
We have extended an invitation to President Gorbachev. Of course, we all think in terms of President Gorbachev. Without President Gorbachev, none of this would have happened, either the changes that he is bringing about in the Soviet Union, the fuller freedom of speech and discussion which has already taken place in [end p12] the Soviet Union so that the atmosphere there is completely different; the changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe, including East Germany—none of that would have come about, none of this new hope for the future would have come about without him, so of course we extend the invitation to him; we extend it to him as President Gorbachev and he will take it up in that capacity and it will be something to look forward to.
We don't know quite when it will be. We were asked this morning and I said immediately that I thought it would be better after a CFE Agreement had been signed because you can then point not merely to negotiations but to the results of negotiations and starting to implement it and we will have to decide—or he will have to indicate precisely which forum of NATO he would like to address or whether he would like to address the smaller one and then very quickly go on to a larger one, including Members of Parliament in a kind of North Atlantic Assembly, but he will be a very welcome guest and we shall all look forward to it and to a steady improvement of relations—but we will always keep up our own defences.