Prime Minister
Ladies and Gentlemen. It was important that this meeting should be a success for NATO, we have all worked for that. The excellent documents confirm the need for a mix of conventional and nuclear weapons, including ground-based missiles, for the foreseeable future.
The 40th Anniversary Declaration is a strong restatement of NATO's fundamental beliefs in strong defence and a view of how East-West relations should develop.
The comprehensive concept elaborates that approach and is very satisfactory as a restatement of NATO's basic strategy to carry us into the next century. [end p1]
President Bush 's initiative on conventional forces is very welcome and opens the prospect of more rapid progress towards conventional force reductions and that means much greater reductions for the Soviet Union to bring us to parity.
We reached a satisfactory conclusion on SNF which is entirely satisfactory and we have, I think, got a text which underlines the continuing need for effective SNF for the foreseeable future, that means ground-based missiles which will have to be kept up-to-date as the text makes clear. It rules out a third zero and no-one contested that in Council and it makes clear that negotiations will only take place on very strict conditions related to conventional force reductions.
There will be no negotiations on SNF until we have full agreement on conventional force reductions and such an agreement is ratified and is being implemented. And there will be no reductions in SNF until a conventional force reduction agreement has been fully implemented.
If and when those conventional force reductions are agreed and implemented some SNF may be removed, but as the document makes clear, some will always be needed.
Above all, I return to my first point, it is a success for NATO for strong defence and for the principles and values which have guided us for forty years. [end p2]
Question (John Dickie, Daily Mail)
You are committed by this comprehensive concept to engage in negotiations as soon as implementation is under way, in other words when the first tank starts moving out you would probably be committed to negotiations. Are you not concerned, therefore, that you might be in a position of being at the negotiating table while there was no agreement on modernisation of the Lanoe missile?
Prime Minister
No I am not. First, because the document in general says that we must keep our weapons up-to-date; and second, the document also points out that the United States, supportively, that the United States is doing research and development on the follow-on to Lance and that that is necessary to keep in the timetable for taking a decision on modernisation; thirdly, that the negotiations, as you point out, on SNF cannot start until a massive agreement on conventional has not only been agreed but is under way.
I would agree we have not precisely defined what is under way, only then can your short-range nuclear weapon negotiations start. But not a single one of those weapons can be taken out even if we agree on their partial reduction until the whole of the conventional agreement has been implemented. [end p3]
Then you find also the last and final thing, several places in the document, but specifically in paragraph 63, that there is a fundamental need for short-range nuclear weapons and the reductions in conventional to parity cannot obviate, is the word, that fundamental need for short-range nuclear weapons and of course that includes land-based missiles, sea-based and air-based.
So it is a pretty tight document when you look at the thing as a whole. It repays a very great deal of study, it is very measured and it sets quite tight conditions.
Question (John Dickie, Daily Mail)
One supplementary Prime Minister, there is no obligation to take a decision on modernisation until 1992, by which time you might already be in negotiations if the timetable that President Bush envisages is as quick.
Prime Minister
There is no obligation to take a decision except that there is a general agreement in the document to which we have all signed up that we undertake to keep weapons modernised and up-to-date where necessary. [end p4]
Question (John Palmer, Guardian)
When you visited NATO on a bilateral visit I think little over a year ago Prime Minister, I remember you telling us very forcibly that there could be no question of SNF negotiations at all. You also made the point that anyone suggesting that aircraft be included in the SNF negotiations fundamentally did not understand the difficulties and the problems of European strategy.
You have agreed, in principle, to SNF negotiations, you have agreed to include aircraft. Does this not both represent significant concessions by you here over the last forty-eight hours?
Prime Minister
I found that we had a very much better agreement than the one we struggled to get a year ago when you know we had to struggle to get the statement that our weapons would be kept up-to-date as necessary. That was a real struggle to get that. It has been repeated quite naturally this year.
Now with regard to the aircraft, first I have nothing to add to what I said that there are very tight conditions set upon the beginning of negotiations, and even tighter ones set upon the beginning of the elimination of any short-range nuclear weapons.
And of course what is on the table for conventional reductions now is colossal. As you know, all of that has been put on the table since the last year. [end p5]
With regard to aircraft, we made it quite clear, both President Mitterrand put his reservation for very obvious reasons on the aircraft with regard to what he calls the strategic aircraft, and you will have seen that I made it quite clear that we could not have dual capable aircraft, with the capability of delivering nuclear weapons, included in the 15 percent and I did it for just the very reason that you have in mind. And I understand that it is not necessary at all, in the 15 percent, to tackle the dual capable nuclear aircraft.
Question (John Palmer, Guardian)
Would you have preferred there to be agreement on no SNF talks at this point?
Prime Minister
I am very very satisfied with the total document that we have. I think it is one of the best I have ever seen and it is infinitely better than what we struggled and struggled and struggled, almost alone, to get last year but got it agreed.
The conditions we put on the negotiations, the conditions we have put before any short-range nuclear weapons could in fact be taken out of action, plus the quite clear statement that there will continue to be a need for short-range nuclear weapons, including of land-based missiles, because they are a fundamental part of NATO strategy. [end p6]
That is very very important. I am sure others, do not let me go through the paragraphs, they will have taken you through them, but it repays pretty close consideration. And if I might say so, I think both of the documents were very well drafted and that owes quite a lot to British draftsmanship, particularly to Geoffrey Howe and our team here.
Question (Mia Donna, Brussels Standard)
Prime Minister, it has been made clear that there can only be SNF negotiations after what President Bush called tangible implementation of agreements in Vienna. Does that mean implementation across the board, on tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, aeroplanes, troops, helicopters, on everything?
And the second question, you said it was important that this meeting should be a success and you said: “We all worked very hard for that” . Would you include Mr Genscher in that statement?
Prime Minister
I think they were all working extremely hard in a prolonged negotiation last night and again I repeat what I said earlier, I do not think that negotiation would have been anything like as successful as it was but for the drafting skills and the measured way and the knowledgeable way in which our team tackled it. I think they were almost a brains trust for every other team at one time. But I do pay a great tribute to Geoffrey Howe. [end p7]
On tangible reductions, you are quite right, I do not think the actual word tangible reductions came through, it has changed actually to reductions are under way. There were so many different words that we used. Tangible reductions was there at the start, an American proposal, and I think it is reductions are under way.
You are quite right, it has not in fact been specific and we will have to judge when that beginning point starts. I think one of the very important things is that they will have to have negotiated absolutely in detail the system of how they are going to destroy these weapons and how they are going to verify the destruction.
Because as you know, it is part of President Bush's proposal that the weapons be destroyed. It is no good just taking them back beyond the Urals. Aircraft can reach the Urals to the Western front in three hours, they have got to be destroyed. That means a very complex negotiation on how we are going to manage the destruction and how to verify it.
Question (German TV)
After this compromise are you willing to make lasting peace with the German Government?
Prime Minister
I think you had better put that, I have not started a battle with them, I do not have any problems. If they have them, let them sort theirs out. I do not have any problems. [end p8]
Question (NBC News)
Prior to this Summit there were quite a number of questions, both in Europe and even in the United States, about the quality of President Bush's leadership. Would you say that after this Summit the President is in fact the leader of the Alliance in more than name only and that he was not coming into the Summit, that he has allayed fears, possibly your own, about the quality of leadership?
Prime Minister
I think that George Bushhe has given a very clear lead but I never had much doubt about the quality of leadership. I much prefer a leader to be measured rather than dashing into things and President Bush has given a very measured leadership and that is much much more important in the long run because you get the policies right.
Question (Peter Jenkins)
Chancellor Kohl told us this morning that he was very grateful for the understanding which had been shown for Germany's position by what he described as “most of his European colleagues” . But I wonder if you see this as a compromise in any way between military necessity on the one hand and the political sensitivity of the coalition in Germany on the other?
Prime Minister
As a document on defence, and secure defence, with a mix of conventional and nuclear and with a mix of nuclear having to continue for the foreseeable future, I think it is an excellent [end p9] document. It certainly is one of the best that I have had a hand in, again because of what it says and the way in which it puts it and the conditions which it has built in.
Our task as an Alliance is to have a sure defence and that I believe we have arranged and to have a strategy that will endure for the foreseeable future. That too we have arranged and have set it in the context of East-West relations.
And I think it is this total surrounding context, where you can see how each part fits into the hole, at all stages keeping our security sure, which I think is absolutely first-class.
Now that is what we are an Alliance for and it is just as important for each and every member of that Alliance as it is for any other. So I am very satisfied with it, a lot of work has gone into it and it is very good.
Also, if you have time to look at the Declarations, there are some very interesting things on the follow-up to Helsinki about Eastern Europe and bringing down walls and making certain they have a proper law to defend their interest, making certain they have a way of expressing their views for their internal government, and making certain they can express their views as to the relationship from one country to another. Do not forget that Declaration, it is very good too. [end p10]
Question (Dallas Morning News)
Madam Prime Minister, the word “partial” is underlined in the document. Were the British the ones who insisted on that?
Prime Minister
Insisted on the underlining?
Same Questioner
Yes. It is the only word in the document … .
Prime Minister
When it came to me, it was underlined, so you cannot accuse me! I was very glad it was underlined.
Same Questioner
Who was … [end p11]
Prime Minister
I think you must enquire of other people. It was not me, but I was very glad that it was underlined, but the “partial” does not rest only on the underlining—it rests on the meaning of the word “partial” . As you heard Mr. Wörner say, “partial” cannot mean “entire” and you heard President Bush say that as he understands it, it eliminates the third zero. I challenged them on that in the whole thing and no one quarrelled with me when I said that eliminates the third zero.
But if you go to the other parts of the document to which I have directed your attention, starting I think with paragraph 27 and coming through all those vital paragraphs in the 40s–44, 45, 47–and then going to 63, you will see it is all written there very firmly indeed and wriggle as some people may, that is what they have signed up to.
Question
Prime Minister, you have clearly mentioned already the colossal task that is awaiting the negotiators in Vienna in terms of conventional force reductions. Do you therefore not share President Bush's optimism about the speed with which these reductions can be achieved? I mean, six months! [end p12]
Prime Minister
I think that is a little bit optimistic. I think it is quite optimistic. I think it is very optimistic! (laughter)
Question
Prime Minister, if I could follow up on that, it does envisage the completion of some extremely complex negotiations within six months to a year. Do you not feel that this puts the pressure on for hasty results that might result in some expensive and dangerous decisions?
Prime Minister
No. It does not matter. You never make a dangerous decision because the decision will last long after the negotiations and you have to get the negotiations right and the result right. That is absolutely vital.
But also—as I did point out—the decisions on how you are going to verify the destruction of these things, the kind of inspectorate you will have to have, are themselves, I think, quite a massive thing to negotiate.
President Bush will know a good deal more than I do about how the ratification will have to go through Congress. We, when we had the INF Agreement, in fact had to put some legislation through [end p13] our House. That also, I imagine, will take a time, but you must not ever let an objective of trying to do it as quickly as possible undermine the necessity to go through the argument to get the right decision and undermine the verification.
Of course, a lot depends upon how the other side react to it. There is also a challenge to them, do not forget, to bring their short-range nuclear weapons which I think is something like 1500, down to our level, which they can do unilaterally.
Geoffrey HoweForeign Secretary
I think it is worth adding that had the time been any longer, then no doubt the questions would have been saying, “Do you not think President Bush has been very lax and dilatory in giving such a long time-scale?” but a time has been chosen which is a challenging, manageable and effective one—lot us try and meet it!
Question (Boston Globe)
Back to the third zero question. German officials apparently are telling reporters that this document was carefully drafted not to preclude a third zero; they apparently perceive this as only postponing that decision and not making it.
Prime Minister, what is your assessment of the German assessment? [end p14]
Prime Minister
You do not have to ask me or them. Just read what they have signed up to! Just read it!
When you sign up to something, you sign up to it, and that is that!
Just direct your attention to paragraph 27, which makes it quite clear that: “the role of short-range nuclear weapons is to ensure that there are no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in response to military action. Nuclear forces below the strategic level thus make an essential contribution to deterrence.”
You then go to paragraph 45: “Where nuclear forces are concerned, land-, sea- and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, in the present circumstances and as far as can be foreseen, will be needed in Europe.”
You then go to paragraph 48, which is the partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces, and you have heard what President Bush (said) because it is the United States that has to negotiate. The beginning of that sentence is: “Once implementation of such an agreement is under way, the United States in consultation with the Allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missiles” and you have heard both Mr. Wörner and President Bush say that they thought that eliminated a nuclear zero or “partial” did not mean “entire” . [end p15]
And then you go to paragraph 63, which says quite clearly: “The removal of the imbalance in conventional forces would provide scope for further reductions in the substrategic nuclear forces of members of the integrated military structure, though it would not obviate the need for such forces.”
Now they have signed up to all that. It is not a question of what we say it means—it is a question of what you have signed up to and we all, everyone of us, signed up to that. So that is that!
Question (Sky News)
Prime Minister, one month ago, you maintained there could be no negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons. Have you changed your mind or were you simply outvoted?
Prime Minister
I said “the time for negotiations is premature” . They have not in fact entered into immediate negotiations. They have put very severe constraints on when negotiations can start which are not only until the conventional agreement is completed together with all the verification of that, but you have to start to implement it. Let me not select words. That agreement has to be under way. Only then can your negotiations on short-range start. In the meantime, the work on research and development of FOTL is going on in the United States. [end p16]
When you have started on your negotiations, which can only be for partial reduction, if you reach agreement on that even then you cannot take out a single short-range nuclear weapon until the entire conventional agreement has been fully implemented. They are very very considerable constraints upon it and I am very glad that they have done it. I think they are very effective.
Mike Evans ( “The Times” )
Would you say, Prime Minister, that President Bush's conventional arms control initiative has in fact saved NATO's bacon and that you would still be squabbling, if I may use that word, over short-range nuclear missiles if President Bush had not produced this new momentum and new transformation, as it were, for the Summit?
Prime Minister
I do not know that I would go as far as that, but I think it was a very timely and measured proposal. I think it recognises that sooner or later we have to address the question of aircraft. I think it recognised that what the Russians have put on the table was deliberately intended to strike deep into the heart of the fundamental nature of our defence—and we could not possibly agree to that—and I think, therefore, President Bush has put something on the table which we can first look at from the Alliance viewpoint before it goes on to the Vienna Talks and then, as I indicated and also President Mitterrand indicated, we do not believe that it must not embrace a dual-capable aircraft. [end p17]
So I think it was—yes—measured, imaginative and perhaps had a psychological effect and that is no bad thing in these tricky negotiations and perhaps just lifted the whole thing a little bit.
At any rate, I repeat: in all the time I have been doing these negotiations … it was much less difficult than last year when we really had a battle to get the words “up-to-date” in the thing. This year, you know, you just accept that you have “up-to-date” and the “conventional mix” and the “mix of nuclear weapons” , so it has been a very very good document and worth perusing—both that and the Declaration—in their entirety because it is quite wrong just to lift one or two paragraphs out without seeing how the whole thing fits in as a genuine, comprehensive strategy for now and the foreseeable future to which, as I repeat, everyone has signed up to.